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The Ineffectiveness of Corporate Brand Investments in 
Creating Price Premiums 
ABSTRACT 
B2B branding research indicates that corporate brand equity investments will increase 
suppliers’ price premiums. In contrast, economics of information studies suggest suppliers’ price 
premiums to decrease with their brand investments. This study, building on economics of 
information, tests these contrasting perspectives empirically in a B2B-services context. The 
results show that suppliers’ corporate brand investments are ineffective in creating price 
premiums because brand investments and price premiums provide substituting information of 
unobservable quality. Furthermore, suppliers’ price premiums decrease with buyers’ willingness 
to punish sellers’ quality deception. In contrast, the suppliers’ price premiums increase with their 
provision of warranties and with their customers’ quality sensitiveness. 
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Uncertainty about supplier quality characterizes a variety of goods and services in business-
to-business and consumer markets (e.g., Biong 2013; Erdem, Swait, and Valenzuela 2006; 
Homburg, Klarmann, and Schmitt 2010; Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998; Shapiro 1982). For 
example, buyers of B2B services, such as marketing research, may have difficulties in evaluating 
providers and the value of their services (Wuyts, Verhoef, and Prins 2009). Poor plumbing may 
not be discovered before a building suffers from serious leakage damages (Biong 2013). 
Therefore, when buyers cannot fully ascertain supplier quality before selection, supplier choice 
implies considerable risks (Homburg; Klarmann, and Schmitt 2010). First, buyers risk to choose 
unqualified suppliers (e.g., Akerlof 1970). Second, buyers may have post-purchase problems in 
detecting contractual compliance, thereby risking ending up with low-quality supplies (e.g., 
Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998).  
Under conditions of quality uncertainty economics of information theory, therefore, 
suggests that high-quality sellers need to credibly inform and assure their customers about their 
qualifications and performance (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Klein and Leffler 1981).1 Examples of 
quality assuring mechanisms are brand investments (e.g., Erdem and Swait 1998; Homburg, 
Klarmann, and Schmitt 2010), price premiums (Klein and Leffler 1981), and warranties 
(Soberman 2003). 
Unfortunately, the extant literature is ambiguous about the pricing effects when suppliers 
invest in their corporate brand name to enhance their quality reputation. B2B brand management 
studies suggest corporate brand investments to increase suppliers’ ability to charge price 
premiums (e.g., Bendixen, Bukasa, and Abratt 2004; Persson 2010). In contrast, empirical 
3 
 
information economics studies in B2B and B2C contexts show that buyers would pay lower or 
none price premiums to suppliers with a credible corporate quality reputation (Andrews and 
Benzing 2007; Biong 2013; Png and Reitman 1995; Rao and Bergen 1992). These ambiguous 
findings may have serious implications for firms’ pricing and reputation-building strategies. If, 
for example, corporate brand investments are ineffective for creating price premiums as one 
stream of information economics theory suggests (Rao and Monroe 1996), firms may be misled 
in expected effects of their marketing mix allocations. 
Our study builds on insights from economics of information (e.g., Kirmani and Rao 2000; 
Rao and Monroe 1996; Png and Reitman 1995). In the economics of information literature brand 
investments, warranties and price premiums are marketing mix variables or signals, yet with 
different properties, sellers might apply to provide credible information of their abilities and 
performance (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Klein and Leffler 1981). Common to these variables is that 
they commit sellers to be honest about their high quality because dishonesty will have negative 
economic consequences. Unfortunately, empirical research is sparse about effects when 
marketers combine signals from various categories (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Rao and Monroe 
1996), In our study we examine how the sellers’ price premiums depend on sellers’ corporate 
brand name investments and provision of warranties and on buyers’ reactions to sellers’ service 
quality. However, the corporate brand investments - price premium and warranties –price 
premium effects also depend on sellers’ service attributes, that is whether the sellers’ services 
predominantly have experience or search attributes (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002; Nelson 
1970).2 First, we argue that for experience services, as the size of the sellers’ corporate brand 
name investments and provision of warranties increases, sellers’ ability to charge price premiums 
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will decrease. To the best of our knowledge, our study is among the first to examine empirically 
how corporate brand investments and warranties affect price premiums from a sellers’ 
perspective in a B2B context. 
Second, assuming that B2B purchasing managers are both price and quality sensitive as 
the extant literature suggests (Biong 2013; Darvish, Yasaei, and Saeedi 2009; Håkansson and 
Wootz 1975; Wuyts, Verhoef, and Prins 2009), and assuming that sellers adapt their pricing 
strategies to their perceptions of buyer behavior, we examine how sellers’ price premiums are 
functions of  purchasers’ quality-sensitiveness and willingness to punish quality deception, as 
perceived by the seller. More specifically, we argue that sellers’ price premiums will decrease 
with their perceptions of buyers’ increasing willingness to punish quality deceptions and to 
increase with their perceptions of buyers’ increasing quality-sensitiveness (Rao 1993).  
Third, we compare experience and search services (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002; 
Nelson 1970) explicitly for each set of variables. The economics of information literature is 
explicit that mechanisms for quality assurance, such as brand investments, warranties, and price 
premiums, only apply to experience products and services where credible information of 
unobservable quality is essential (Kirmani and Rao 2000), whereas the B2B brand management 
literature usually does not make this distinction. A third contribution of our study is, therefore, 
that it will provide insights to whether brand equity investments may have different effects on 
pricing for services with experience vs. search attributes. 
We organize the rest of the article as follows: In the following section, we present the 
conceptual framework, including hypotheses. Then we describe the research design and the 
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empirical tests. Finally, we discuss the implications of the findings, the limitations of the study, 
and possible topics for further research. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Economics of Information 
The information economics’ approach to branding and pricing is based on the premise that 
sellers and buyers often have different amounts of information about supplier quality and 
performance (Kirmani and Rao 2000). This information asymmetry makes it difficult for buyers 
to assess correctly sellers’ quality. In transactions where sellers’ abilities and performance are 
uncertain and only can be assessed after purchase and use, sellers and quality-sensitive buyers 
need mechanisms that credibly commit sellers always to be honest about their abilities and 
performance (e.g., Kirmani and Rao 2000: Png and Reitman 1995). The economics of 
information literature suggests signals and incentives to be such quality assuring mechanisms, 
for example brand name investments, warranties, and price premiums (e.g., Akerlof 1970; 
Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998; Soberman 2003). Common to these mechanisms is that they 
credibly commit the seller to be honest throughout transactions by rewarding honesty through 
enhanced revenues and punishing dishonesty through loss of money in post-purchase situations 
(Klein and Leffler 1981; Picard 1987; Rao and Monroe 1996). Corporate brand name 
investments commit sellers to provide high quality because repeat business recovers the 
investments (e.g., Homburg, Klarmann, and Schmitt 2010). Warranties commit sellers to provide 
high quality by avoiding future repair costs should they cheat on their quality promises. A price 
premium, the difference between a super-high price and the perfectly competitive price for high-
6 
 
quality output (Rao and Monroe 1996), provides high-quality sellers with above-average profits 
(Klein and Leffler 1981). The above-average profits credibly commit sellers to be honest and 
always to deliver high quality (Klein and Leffler 1981; Rao and Monroe 1996). Otherwise, 
quality sensitive buyers will punish quality debasement3 by stopping buying and the high profits 
will be lost. Therefore, buyers can infer the sellers’ quality level and performance from their 
quality assuring strategy (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Rao and Monroe 1996). In essence, in this 
perspective a price premium is an extra payment committing sellers always to be honest about 
their high quality in pre- and post-purchase situations. 
It should be noted that price premiums are conceptually different from premium prices. The 
literature assumes that there is more costly to produce high than low quality (Klein and Leffler 1981; 
Rao 1993; Rao and Monroe 1996). A high-quality seller will claim to be compensated for the higher 
production costs by charging a “commensurately” higher price (Rao 1993). Hence, a high-quality 
supplier charging a high price that only compensates for the higher production cost with the same 
profit as a low quality product in the same category would receive a premium price.  
B2B Corporate Brand Management 
Brand equity is a key concept in the B2B brand management literature (e.g., Kotler and 
Pfoertsch 2006; van Riel, de Mortanges, and Streukens 2005). Brand equity and  the related 
concept brand image are the outcomes of past investments in the marketing mix variables (e.g., 
Erdem and Swait 1998; van Riel, de Mortanges, and Streukens 2005). Findings from reviews of 
the empirical B2B brand management research can be summarized as: (1) the dominating B2B 
branding strategy is to build corporate brand awareness (e.g., Homburg, Klarmann, and Schmitt 
2010; Zablah, Brown, and Donthu 2010) and (2) corporate brands matter for buyer preference 
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(e.g., Roberts and Merrilees 2007; van Riel, de Mortanges, and Streukens 2005; Zablah, Brown, 
and Donthu 2010). Drivers of B2B brand equity are perceived quality, name awareness, brand 
associations, and brand loyalty (Kotler and Pfoertsch 2006). Brand equity and a favorable brand 
image may positively affect products’ and services’ perceived quality and enable a firm to charge 
price premiums; the higher the perceived quality, the higher the potential for price premiums (e.g., 
Bendixen, Abratt, and Bukasa 2004; Persson 2010). However, Ailawadi, Lehman, and Neslin 
(2003) modify the emphasize on price premiums and brand equity by noting that in the market 
place there are many strong, value-priced corporate brands (e.g., WalMart, Ryanair). Hence, 
corporate brand equity also should encompass a company’s ability to capture market shares at 
competitive prices. In essence, corporate brand equity in the brand management perspective 
might be a company’s ability to achieve revenue premiums through volume or price (Ailawadi, 
Neslin and Lehman 2003). It should be noted that B2B brand management research based on 
brand equity models usually do not make assumptions of asymmetric information and quality 
uncertainty of suppliers’ products and services.  
Common to the economics of information and the brand management literature, is the 
relationship between sellers’ corporate brand equity enhancing activities and abilities to charge 
price premiums. In the economics of information perspective, for experience products and services 
price premiums serve three functions: (1) they credibly inform buyers of high-quality sellers’ abilities 
and performance, (2) they assure quality-sensitive buyers of sellers’ honesty, i.e.,  that sellers will not 
cheat on quality, and (3) they are payment (premiums) from quality-sensitive buyers for high quality 
performance, as noted. 
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In the brand equity perspective a price premium might be a reward for perceived higher 
quality services with higher utility relative to competitors (Ailawadi, Lehman, and Neslin 2003; 
Rao and Monroe 1996). In that respect, information of economics and brand management may 
converge. However, the brand management perspective does not assume explicitly quality 
assuring properties of price premiums. 
Corporate Brand Investments and Price Premiums 
Dissemination of corporate brand names and logos is central for many companies to convey 
information about their quality, people, skills, and behavior (Akerlof 1970; Gordon, Calantone, 
and di Benedetto 1993; Homburg, Klarmann, and Schmitt ; Kotler and Pfoertsch 2007). In fact, 
building corporate brand awareness without developing a more comprehensive brand identity is 
the focal B2B branding strategy for many firms (Homburg, Klarmann, and Schmitt 2010). The 
company brand name assures buyers that the supplier is the responsible party should quality not 
meet expectations. Additionally, suppliers might make their corporate brand names more 
credible through brand investments, such as advertising or other activities to make the name 
known to the public (Erdem and Swait 1998; Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002; Milgrom and 
Roberts 1986). For example, recent B2B branding studies show how corporate brand awareness 
positively affects brand and firm market performance (Homburg, Klarmann, and Schmitt 2010; 
Zablah, Brown, and Donthu 2009). Brand investments involve expenditures of money regardless 
of whether anyone buys the service without providing direct benefits to the buyer (Kirmani and 
Rao 2000; Klein and Leffler 1981). The quality-assuring properties of brand investments are that 
sellers commit themselves credibly by spending money even if a sale has not occurred, intending 
to recover the expenditures through future sales to buyers caring about high quality (Homburg, 
9 
 
Klarmann, and Schmitt 2010). Hence, suppliers with large brand investments make themselves 
vulnerable to quality cheating because cheating on quality will reduce return on investments in 
brand name capital (Rao and Monroe 1996). The higher the investments, the higher the seller’s 
commitment to provide high quality and the less likely the seller will cheat on quality.  
However, if both price premiums and corporate brand name are commitments to provide 
high quality, a credible corporate brand name may reduce the price premium’s function as a 
substitute for missing information of quality (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002). Similarly, 
Ippolito (1990, p. 53) argues that increase in the bonding effect of advertising reduces the size of 
the price premium. Rational buyers know that sellers intending to stay in the market risk their 
reputation and brand investments by cheating on quality with negative consequences for profits. 
Therefore, there should be little reason for the buyers to pay sellers with large brand investments 
a price premium to prevent quality cheating. This argument parallels previous findings, buyers 
would not pay price premiums to sellers having invested in a corporate quality reputation (e.g., 
Andrews and Benzing 2007; Biong 2013; Png and Reitmann 1995). Still, suppliers with corporate 
brand investments may try to charge price premiums in their market offerings. However, when 
buyers compare similar offers from reputed quality sellers, they will most likely award the contract to 
a supplier offering the best competitive market price because reputed sellers can be trusted. Hence, 
sellers having credibly informed about their quality through corporate brand investments might lose 
contracts if they charge price premiums above a competitive market price. Then through market feed-
back (Connelly et al. 2011) , sellers may revise their pricing policy and charge competitive market 
prices next time they submit bids. 
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H1a: The level of price premiums to sellers of experience services will decrease with 
increases in their level of corporate brand investments. 
In theory, markets for search services should be perfectly competitive and therefore, the 
prices for equal-quality services should be the same across all suppliers, reflecting the services’ 
true value. In practice, markets and prices are seldom so (Stigler 1961). Often, prices vary for the 
same service, of the same quality, in the same market, and at the same time (e.g., Maynes and 
Assum 1982; Salop and Stiglitz 1977). This observation is explained by buyers’ lack of search, 
which allows some sellers to take advantage of buyers’ incomplete search and charge a high 
price that may include a price premium (Maynes and Assum 1982). Conversely, more search 
activities by buyers should better inform them of the prices in the markets and provide them with 
lower prices (Stigler 1961; Tellis and Wernerfelt 1987). For search services the purposes of 
brand investments are different and more limited than they are for experience services (Rubin 
1993). One purpose of brand investments for search services is to increase brand awareness. 
Another is to inform buyers about prices and availability. Brand investments for search services 
should, therefore, assist buyers in their search efforts for low prices and better inform them about 
the prices offered in the market place (Rao and Bergen 1992; Stigler 1961). Hence, corporate 
brand investments for search services, such as advertising, should make search and comparisons 
between suppliers easier and even make it easier for buyers to select the lowest priced supplier, 
thereby reducing the sellers’ ability to charge price premiums (Kalra and Goodstein 1998). 
H1b: The level of price premiums paid to sellers of search services will decrease with 
increases in their level of corporate brand investments. 
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Although the predicted effects of brand investments on price premiums are the same for 
experience and search services, we will emphasize that the underlying reasons differ. For 
experience services, brand investments reduce information asymmetry about unobserved quality, 
whereas for search services, brand investments reduce information asymmetry about price 
dispersion. 
Warranties and Price Premiums 
“A warranty is a promise, made by a manufacturer or seller, that a product or certain of 
its performance characteristics are free from defects in materials and workmanship; it is a 
commitment to correct problems if the product fails during the warranty period” (Menezes and 
Quelch 1990, p. 70). In our context, a contract that specifies adherence to industry standards 
regarding components and workmanship usually regulates buyer-seller transactions. Thus, a 
supplier provides a warranty when both the length and the scope of the supplier’s responsibilities 
for correcting failures caused by component or workmanship defects exceed what standard 
contracts and legislation specify. The extant literature shows that warranties can serve both 
signaling and incentive purposes (Cooper and Ross 1985; Emons 1989) and that warranties 
motivate firms to produce high quality (Boulding and Kirmani 1993; Grossman 1981; Shapiro 
1982; Spence 1977; Wiener 1985). 
Unlike brand investments, a warranty is costless when the seller provides this signal. 
Future costless repair in case of service quality failure commits the seller to provide high quality 
during all transactions (Chu and Chintagunta 2011). Thus, the bonding effect of a warranty 
derives from these future repair costs. The higher the future repair costs in case of service failure, 
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the higher the sellers’ commitment to provide high quality. For large installation-projects, repair 
and costs of rectifying defects could be substantial and the profit on the project will be reduced 
or in worst case lost. A low-quality firm thus will face higher repair costs than will a high-quality 
firm, and is therefore less likely to provide warranties (Emons 1989). Rational buyers then can 
infer the sellers’ unobservable quality from the warranties sellers offer (Emons 1989; Kirmani 
and Rao 2000). The arguments for linking warranties to price premiums parallel the arguments 
for brand investments and price premiums. Sellers providing warranties as a “bond” for 
performance put future costs at risk, so there should be less need for buyers to motivate sellers to 
produce high quality by paying them price premiums (Allen 1984; Ippolito 1990). Consequently, 
when a seller provides a warranty its ability to charge price premiums should decrease. 
H2a: The level of price premiums to sellers of experience services will decrease with 
increases in their level of warranties. 
As noted, buyers can detect search services’ quality before purchase. Sellers providing 
services with quality below buyers’ acceptable level will not achieve business. Therefore, 
warranties are not needed as quality assurance, and the sellers will not be able to charge price 
premiums. This argument is in line with Chu and Chintaguta’s (2011) findings from the U.S. 
server market. When buyers are well informed of product quality, they do not need to infer 
quality from warranties. 
H2b: For search services sellers’ price premiums and warranty levels will not be related.  
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Punishment and Price Premiums 
The sellers’ ability to charge price premiums not only depends on their quality assuring 
activities but also on two buyer behavior characteristics: the buyers’ quality-sensitiveness and the 
buyers’ willingness to punish a deceitful seller by stopping buying (Rao 1993). If sellers know 
that buyers will not punish them for being dishonest, they may exploit the situation by charging 
price premiums. Similarly, if buyers are unwilling or unable to punish sellers when they detect 
violation of the sellers’ quality promise, sellers will have little to lose by cheating. Conversely, if 
buyers are willing to punish a seller by stopping buying if that seller cheats, the seller will lose 
all future profits (Rao 1993). However, this mechanism will function only in a competitive 
market with available alternatives and few long-term commitments or switching barriers between 
the actors (Rao and Monroe 1996; Wathne, Biong, and Heide 2001) as in the context of this 
study. For example, when starting a construction project contractors usually invite potential 
suppliers to submit tenders based on assessments of their previous performance (Blombäck and 
Axelsson 2007). Suppliers will have much to loose by not fulfilling their quality promises, 
because buyers probably will not invite poor performers to submit tenders in the future. Thus, 
suppliers perceiving the risks of being omitted from bidding on future projects to be high, should 
be more likely to be honest and to receive only a competitive price commensurate with their 
quality level (Rao 1993; Rao and Monroe 1996). Conversely, if suppliers perceive they will be 
invited to submit bids in spite of previous poor quality performance, their potential for charging 
price premiums for substandard quality should increase.  
H3a: The level of price premiums to sellers of experience services will decrease with 
increases in the perceived buyers’ willingness to punish for quality cheating.  
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For search services, buyers can detect quality upon purchase. Therefore, buyers should 
pay prices commensurate with the services’ quality level. High-quality sellers will receive 
premium prices, whereas low-quality sellers will receive low prices. If sellers cheat and provide 
quality beyond lowest acceptable level, quality-sensitive buyers will detect cheating immediately 
and punish low-quality suppliers by simply not buying from them (Rao and Monroe 1996). 
H3b: The level of price premiums to sellers of search services will decrease with 
increases in the perceived buyers’ willingness to punish sellers for quality cheating. 
Quality-Sensitiveness and Price Premiums 
As noted, an underlying premise of our study is that some buyers value high quality and 
are willing to pay a price premium for it (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Rao and Monroe 1996). 
Especially, if inferior quality from the supplier will lead to monetary losses for the buyer, 
selection of high-quality suppliers is essential (Biong 2013). Unfortunately, sellers of experience 
services may change and undersupply quality during services delivery, for example by using 
substandard components or unskilled workers, because quality reductions provide immediate 
cost savings and are difficult to detect (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998). If buyers employ a 
competitive bidding model to achieve low prices in selecting their suppliers, this practice may 
exacerbate the problems described (Liebeskind and Rumelt 1989). Dyer (1996), for example,  
reports that Chrysler experienced serious quality problems when the company forced its 
component suppliers to engage in fierce price competition for Chrysler’s business on short-term 
contracts. It should be noted that there might be situations where sellers cannot fully control and 
measure the quality of services provided, which complicates sellers’ ability to maintain their 
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reputation as high-quality sellers (Liebeskind and Rumelt 1989). Liebeskind and Rumelt (1989) 
suggest that this problem can be resolved if the buyer promises to repurchase provided the seller 
can promise to supply high- quality services at the next delivery at the buyer’s reservation price. 
Thus, the seller can maintain its price for high quality. 
Quality-sensitive buyers, therefore, may pay high-quality sellers a price premium and 
continue to repurchase to ensure supplier quality, whereas buyers with lower need for quality 
will not buy at the high price (Kirmani and Rao 2000). The more important high quality is, the 
higher buyers’ willingness to pay price premiums should be, as extant research shows (e.g., 
Biong 2013). High-quality sellers, therefore, should be able to charge quality sensitive buyers 
price premiums as long as they fulfill their quality promises. Thus, price premiums also should 
motivate sellers to deploy governance mechanisms to achieve high quality throughout the value 
chain and buyers should receive the promised service quality (Ghosh and John 1999; Mishra, 
Heide, and Cort 1998). 
H4a: The level of price premiums to sellers of experience services will increase with 
increases in the level of perceived buyers’ quality-sensitiveness. 
Quality-sensitive buyers are likely to have a higher utility for quality and they will 
therefore engage in more search for information about quality and prices (Png and Reitman 
1995). Because of their search activities, quality-sensitive buyers will be better able to detect 
whether the quality level and prices charged reflect the quality level. If the quality level and 
prices are not commensurate, quality-sensitive buyers will not buy at the high price. In our 
research context, subcontractors to the construction industry, buyers generally award contracts 
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on a competitive bidding basis, which drives prices down (Burt and Boyett 1979). Since 
organizing competitive bidding processes is costly to buyers, quality- and price-sensitive buyers 
should be expected to engage more extensively in bidding processes than are the less sensitive 
buyers (Maynes and Assum 1982). Thus, for search services the seller should be less able to 
charge price premiums to buyers they perceive to be quality-sensitive. 
H4b: The level of price premiums to sellers of search services will decrease with 
increases in the level of perceived buyers’ quality-sensitiveness. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 Research Context 
The research context for our study is that of subcontractors who supply plumbing and 
electrical installation services to the construction industry. This context was chosen for five 
reasons. First, the academic literature (e.g., Shapiro 1982) and interviews with buyers and 
industry experts showed that buyers to varying degrees have problems in distinguishing between 
high- and low-quality suppliers of electric and plumbing services. In addition, some of these 
services’ quality attributes may be revealed only after a long time. On the other hand, installation 
standards exist that expert-buyers, such as the buyers in this context, can assess easily. Second, 
trade reports and interviews with industry experts indicated that these plumbing and electrical 
installation services have a particular influence on the final building quality and are the most 
prominent problem areas. Therefore, according to our panel of industry experts, contractors 
define suppliers of plumbing and electrical installation services as being among their strategic 
subcontractors. The quality problems mentioned are often increased by complex buying 
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processes and unclear distribution of responsibility between builders, contractors, and 
subcontractors (Espelien and Reve 2007). Third, industry experts indicated that various signals 
and incentives are relevant mechanisms for resolving potential adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems in this industry. Fourth, suppliers should be the closest ones to observe effects 
of their marketing strategies. Fifth and finally, suppliers to construction projects are traditionally 
chosen based on a competitive bidding procedure despite the possibility that quality may suffer 
by choosing the lowest priced bidder (Holt, Olomolaiye, and Harris 1995).  
 Sample Frame and Design 
Two databases, one a commercial database with information about contact persons and 
economic information about companies providing installation services, and one the membership 
list of an industry association representing suppliers of plumbing and electrical installation 
services to the construction industry, formed the basis for the survey sample. Based on NACE 
codes4 we extracted a subset of service suppliers with the appropriate characteristics from the 
commercial database. Then the two databases were merged and duplicates removed. This 
procedure provided a list of 1611 companies with complete contact details (phone numbers, 
email address, web site, mailing address) and other relevant company information. 
Since many of the suppliers are small companies without dedicated marketing persons 
and the study’s issues are of a strategic nature, we decided to request that the suppliers’ CEOs 
serve as key informants (Campbell 1955). The qualitive prestudy underlined that the CEOs in 
these firms actively are involved in developing and implementing the suppliers’ strategy and 
marketing programs. Data was collected by distributing a digital questionnaire to the companies’ 
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e-mail addresses using an Internet-based market research program (Confirmit). To increase the 
study’s credibility, the names and logos of the industry association and of a research center 
affiliated with our business school were included in the cover letter. After two reminders, we 
received 235 completed questionnaires – a response rate of 14.6%. As non-response bias might 
be a concern, we used the Armstrong and Overton (1977) procedure to test for non-response 
bias. The results showed no statistical differences between early and late respondents on 
variables such as service category (Chi-square 1.005, 1 df, p > 0.05), number of employees (t-
value difference -9.217, 190 df, p > 0.05), informants’ company position (Chi-square 6.923, 6 df, 
p > 0.05) and strategic competence (t-value difference -0.129, 170 df, p > 0.05), and company 
revenue (t-value difference -29.843, 164 df, p > 0.05). Thus, we concluded that there was little 
likelihood of non-response bias and that we could proceed with testing our hypotheses. 
Moreover, the total of 235 respondents is adequate for performing the required statistical 
analyses because the sample reflects the underlying theoretical assumptions and provides 
satisfactory variance on the focal variables, and because it covers the two subgroups of search 
and experience services (Sudman 1996, p. 110). Within the sample, 71% of the companies 
provided electrical installation services, 15% provided plumbing installation services, and 14% 
provided both electrical and plumbing installation services. 
 Development of Measures 
Appendix A reports the measures we used in the study, together with the factor loadings 
for each item. The scale items are anchored by the values 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly 
agree. 
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Performance ambiguity denotes the extent to which buyers can assess service quality 
before purchase and use. The scale consists of seven items building on the operationalizations of 
Mishra, Heide, and Cort (1998), and on the product type and lag scales of Rao and Bergen 
(1992). 
Price premiums refer to the difference between a super-high price and the perfectly 
competitive price for high-quality output (Kirmani and Rao 2000). We used four items by 
adopting the operationalizations of Mishra, Heide, and Cort (1998) and of Rao and Bergen 
(1992).  
Quality-sensitiveness describes the seller’s perception of the buyer’s utility for high 
quality and the loss the buyer would incur if the seller were to provide low-quality services. The 
scale, adopted from that of Rao and Bergen (1992), consists of three items. 
Punishment denotes the seller’s perception of the buyer’s willingness, upon detecting 
quality debasement, to punish the seller by stopping buying and by not doing further business. 
The punishment scale, adopted from that of Rao and Bergen (1992), uses two items to measure 
this construct. 
Corporate brand investments measure the expenditures employed to make the company 
brand name known to the public. The scale, adopted from Erdem and Swait’s (1998) brand 
investments scale, consists of three items.  
Warranties refers to the seller’s responsibilities for correcting failures caused by 
component or workmanship defects that exceed what is regulated by standard contracts and 
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legislation in both length and scope. We developed four items for measuring this construct based 
on the conceptual discussions of Boulding and Kirmani (1993), Menezes and Quelch (1990), and 
Soberman (2003). 
We included the seller’s reputation as a control variable in our model. Reputation is the 
generally held perception in the market about the seller’s quality and honesty. Our scale consists 
of three items and builds on the reputation scales developed by Erdem and Swait (1998), and by 
Rao and Bergen (1992). 
 Measurement Model and Validity Test 
To test the research model, the analysis used the statistical program SAS JMP 8. The 
statistical analysis began with a review of the convergent validity, the discriminant validity, and 
the descriptive statistics of the constructs. 
First, an Exploratory Factor Analysis and the use of Varimax rotation estimated the factor 
loadings for the six latent constructs, reported in the Appendix. All items showed factor loadings 
greater than 0.37. The reliability for the three quality-sensitiveness items was 0.70. Therefore, 
the three items were included in the further analysis. The factor analysis, together with the 
Cronbach’s alpha, confirmed the convergent validity of the variables in the model. For the 
further analysis, the items’ factor scores were used to calculate the constructs. 
The discriminant validity analysis examined whether the constructs were non-redundant. 
Discriminant validity might be biased due to random measurement error and/or systematic 
measurement errors. Bagozzi and Yi (1988) points out that the constructs can be tested for 
redundancy by investigating the correlation between them. Table 1 reports that none of the 
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correlations’ +/ - 2 standard deviations includes 1. Next, the Campbell and Fiske (1959) 
procedure tests the extent to which two constructs overlap, by taking the correlation coefficient 
divided by the square root of the multiplied reliability of the two constructs. None of these values 
exceeded the recommended level of 0.85 (ranging from -0.11 for price premiums and brand 
investments to 0.34 for punishment and warranties). 
The constructs’ descriptive statistics, reported in Table 1, show that the control variable 
reputation has a mean score of 6.08 on a scale from 1 to 7, and a standard deviation of 1.41. 
There might be some degree of social desirability inherent in the scale; however, were it to be 
present, it would not necessarily bias tests (based on correlations, regressions, and similar 
techniques) of hypotheses (Bagozzi 1996, p. 28). The analysis shows that the constructs are 
valid, and that they can be used in the tests of the hypotheses. 
-------------------------------------- 
Place Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 Model Analysis 
To test the research model, we implemented a two-group analysis using an OLS estimate 
and SAS JMP 8. To classify sellers of experience and search services (Nelson 1970), the analysis 
mapped how the sellers perceived buyers’ ability to determine quality prior to purchase. In the 
classification process, we used a measure of (perceived) performance ambiguity concerning 
assessing the sellers’ service quality. We developed a summated scale based on the factor scores. 
The informants were divided into two groups, Sellers of experience services were identified as 
those informants above the summated scale’s mean value, whereas sellers of search services 
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were identified as those informants below the summated scale’s mean value. In total, 119 
informants were labeled as sellers of experience services and 116 as sellers of search services. 
The next section discusses each of the hypotheses in the research model. 
RESULTS 
The results from the two-group OLS estimates are reported in Table 2. Due to our directional 
hypotheses, the analyses are based on one-tailed tests. Table 2 shows that the effect of supplier 
brand investments on the level of price premiums is significant for experience services but not 
for search services (H1a: -0.16, p-value < 0.05; H1b: -0.09, p-value ns.) supporting Hypothesis 
1a but not Hypothesis 1b. Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 2a, we find that the level of 
price premiums to sellers of experience services increases with their level of warranties (H2a: 
0.36, p-value < 0.01). As predicted in Hypothesis 2b, we find no relationship between sellers’ 
price premiums and their levels of warranties for search services (H2b: 0.10, p-value ns.). 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predicted a negative relationship between the buyers’ willingness to 
punish for quality debasement and the level of price premiums for both sellers of experience 
services and for sellers of search services. We find, as hypothesized, that the level of price 
premiums to sellers of experience services decreases with increases in the willingness to punish 
for quality debasement, supporting Hypothesis 3a. In contrast, for sellers of search services we 
find no significant relationship between price premiums and buyers’ willingness to punish for 
low quality. Therefore Hypothesis 3b was not supported (H3a: -0.18, p-value < 0.05; H3b: -0.08, 
p-value ns.). The fourth set of hypotheses predicted that the level of sellers’ price premiums 
should increase with increases in the buyer’s quality sensitiveness both for experience and for 
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search services, Hypotheses 4a and 4b. As Table 2 shows, Hypothesis 4a but not Hypothesis 4b 
are supported (H4a: 0.21, p-value < 0.01; H4b: 03, p-value ns.). In sum, four out of our eight 
hypotheses receive statistical support.  
The results show no significant relationship between the control variable reputation and 
price premiums either for sellers of experience or search services. Finally, we comment briefly 
on our models of search and experience services respectively (Table 2). As Rao and Bergen 
(1992) note, factors that are relevant for explaining price premiums for experience services do 
not apply well to search services. Our models for search and experience services, Table 2, 
support this perspective. While R2 is close to zero in our search-service model (0.03), the value 
in our experience-service model compares well with that in Rao and Bergen’s (1992) model, 
with R2 values at 0.19 and 0.24, respectively. 
-------------------------------------- 
Place Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION 
Theoretical Implications 
A growing body of B2B branding research indicates that brand equity investments will pay 
off by price premiums and increased supplier preference (e.g., Bendixen, Bukasa, and Abratt 
2004; Hutton 1997; Persson 2010). In contrast, economics of information studies indicate that 
brand investments are positive for supplier selection, but reduce suppliers’ ability to charge price 
premiums (e.g., Andrews and Benzing 2007; Biong 2013; Rao 1993; Rao and Monroe 1996).  
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These contrasting findings leave unanswered questions because price usually is highly 
important for final B2B-supplier choice, and, generally, a high price is negative (e.g., Biong 
2013; Wuyts, Verhoef and Prins 2009). In our study, we draw on information economics theory 
to shed light on these contrasting findings by examining how suppliers’ ability to charge price 
premiums are affected by their corporate brand name investments and their provision of 
warranties. Corporate brand investments, warranties, and price premiums are marketing mix 
variables suppliers deploy to build brand equity and to inform of their qualities and performance 
in the marketplace. Therefore, examination of their combined effects from a supplier perspective 
should be a contribution to the literature. We examine the effects for both experience and service 
services in a context of subcontractors to the construction industry. In this context, buyers 
usually chose subcontractors after a bidding process, emphasizing low price. Unfortunately, 
substandard service quality from subcontractors often causes serious quality problems to the final 
constructions with economic losses for the contractors. Hence we included subcontractors’ 
perceptions of buyers’ quality-sensitiveness and willingness to punish quality deception in our 
model.  
First, the finding showing that sellers’ ability to charge price premiums decreases with 
increasing levels of corporate brand investments may be counterintuitive but is in line with 
argumentation from economics of information (Ippolito 1990; Rao 1993; Rao and Monroe 
1996). For sellers of experience services, high-quality sellers credibly need to inform quality-
sensitive buyers about their abilities and quality performance. Both price premiums and 
corporate brand investments serve such information purposes (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Milgrom 
and Roberts 1986). By investments in corporate brand names and logos, sellers credibly commit 
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themselves always to provide high and consistent quality of their services (Erdem and Swait 
1998; Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002). Similarly, the above-normal profit from price 
premiums serves the same function, as explained. Therefore, our findings indicate that corporate 
brand investments and price premiums substitute each other as credible information of 
unobservable quality (Kirmani and Rao 2000). Thus, when corporate brand investments commit 
the seller, there should be less need for buyers additionally to pay a supernormal price (Biong 
2013; Rao and Monroe 1996). We do not suggest that companies with high corporate brand 
investments do not receive price premiums. What we found is that the size of price premiums 
decreased with increasing levels of corporate brand investments.  
Contrary to our prediction, we find that price premiums increase with increases in sellers’ 
use of warranties exceeding standard contract obligations. Our data suggest that other 
components than the quality assuring properties are present for sellers’ warranties and that these 
components may have an impact on sellers’ abilities to charge price premiums. The theoretical 
and empirical literature uniformly agrees that warranties are signals and incentives for providing 
high quality services (e.g. Boulding and Kirmani 1993; Emons 1989; Soberman 2003). In that 
sense, warranties and price premiums might provide substitutions for quality assurance, as we 
predicted. However, suppliers offering contracts with a warranty may be perceived by the buyers 
to offer a service with perceived higher quality than suppliers offering the same service without a 
warranty to influence supplier preference. We will remind that in our research context, suppliers 
of electrical installation and plumbing services, the buyer usually defines the specifications of the 
work to be done (Blombäck and Axelsson 2007), whereas the supplier chooses whether to offer 
the services with or without a warranty. In the non-warranty situation the supplier’s corporate 
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brand investments assures service quality, as discussed. Hence, there should be less need to pay 
price premiums in addition. In the warranty situation, the warranty assures service quality but 
also provides higher quality (more of the desirable characteristics (Klein and Leffler 1981)) 
through future costless repair in case of service quality failure. Hence, buyers might be willing to 
pay a price premium for this higher quality (Rao and Monroe 1996), whereas more price-
sensitive buyers may choose the cheaper contract that lacks one (Chu and Chintagunta 2011). By 
showing that corporate brand investments and warranties may affect differently sellers’ ability to 
charge price premiums, our findings contribute to the understanding of how various types of 
signals act as marketing tools. 
Second, we examined the effect of buyer behavior –specifically sellers’ perceptions of 
buyers’ willingness to punish deceitful sellers and of buyers’ quality sensitiveness – on sellers’ 
ability to charge price premiums. We find that when sellers fear that buyers will punish quality 
deceptions by stopping buying, sellers’ price premiums decrease, consistent with theoretical 
predictions (Rao 1993). Next, consistent with previous studies (Biong 2013; Rao and Bergen 
1992), we find that sellers’ price premiums increases with increases in buyers’ quality-
sensitiveness, as perceived by the seller. When sellers know that quality debasement may cause 
substantial economic losses to the buyers, charging a price premium may be a credible 
commitment to provide high quality.  
Third, in our comparison between experience and search services, we find that the 
signaling model in our study does not apply well to search services, a result conforming to the 
economics of information theory and to the results of previous studies (Chu and Chintagunta 
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2011; Rao and Bergen 1992). Whereas signals provide information about sellers’ unobservable 
quality for experience services, buyers do not need to rely on signals such as warranties and 
corporate brand investments to be assured of the quality provided by sellers of search services. 
Nor do they need to pay price premiums for quality assurance, as noted. 
Finally, our findings may suggest some tentative explanations addressing the contrasting 
findings of brand management and information of economics studies. Whereas a high price is 
generally negative for supplier preference, it can also serve quality information purposes (Biong 
2013, Klein and Leffler 1981). As noted, price premiums may lose their information and bonding 
function when suppliers invest in their corporate brand name awareness. Buyers will therefore 
pay lower price premiums to reputed sellers with equal quality services because their corporate 
brand investments assure service quality. If sellers should be able to charge price premiums they 
should provide services with a higher quality (more of the desirable benefits) relative to 
competitors, as the effect of warranties indicates (Rao and Monroe 1996). The success of value-
based corporate branded companies such as WalMart, Southwest, and Suave, inspired Ailawadi, 
Lehman, and Neslin (2003) to suggest that these companies’ strong brand equity originated from 
their ability to capture market shares at competitive prices, and not from their abilities to charge 
price premiums. Rather, price premiums may result in significant losses in volume. Hence, in 
those authors’ terminology, the brand equity concept should be measured as a company’s ability 
to generate revenue premiums through volume premiums, price premiums, and combinations of 
volume and price. In this perspective, the corporate brand of value-based companies guarantees 
their consistent quality, which enables them to compete effectively on price. Hence, the 
information economics and brand management perspectives may converge. A strong corporate 
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brand equity, supported by corporate brand investments is generally positive for buyer 
preference, assures product and service quality and makes competitive prices trustworthy. If 
sellers should be able to charge price premiums they should provide higher quality products and 
services relative to their competitors, and the higher the perceived quality, the higher the 
potential for price premiums (e.g, Bendixen, Bukasa, and Abratt 2004: Rao and Monroe 1996). 
Implications for Management 
In highly competitive business markets with many suppliers of apparently similar 
services, as in our context, high-quality suppliers face the marketing challenge of winning 
contracts in competition with lower quality competitors and of achieving a price rewarding their 
efforts in providing high quality. This is especially the case when buyers cannot fully assess the 
quality of suppliers’ services before contract agreement. 
In such situations, high-quality sellers may intuitively want to support their quality 
strategy by building their brand equity through corporate brand name investments (e.g., 
Homburg, Klarmann, and Schmitt 2010; Zablah, Brown, and Donthu 2010). Investments in 
corporate brand name awareness is in line with the dominating B2B brand building strategy 
towards building corporate brand preference, because buyers generally prefer well-known sellers 
(Blombäck and Axelsson 2007; Wuyts, Verhoef, and Prins 2009). Well-known and reputable 
sellers should therefore capture larger market shares, and within the same industry, reputable 
sellers usually also are relatively more profitable than are competitors who lack a reputation for 
quality.  
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Yet, it is a paradox that sellers’ ability to charge price premiums decreases when their 
corporate brand investments increase, as our findings indicate, but it does not mean that 
companies should not invest to make their corporate brand name known. When price and quality 
matter to buyers, as it does in many business markets, buyers know that they can trust companies 
with large corporate brand name investments to provide high quality at competitive prices. If the 
sellers do not deliver the quality they promise, they will lose future business and the corporate 
brand investments will not pay off. 
Brand investments require monetary spending regardless of sales. Since they also 
undermine the potential for achieving price premiums, brand investments might be an effective 
entry barrier against competition. Corporate brand investments, therefore, may be less feasible 
for new firms or firms with limited financial resources. For such companies our results suggest 
warranties to be an option to build brand equity and a credible quality reputation. In competitive 
markets sellers may offer warranties without extra costs to the buyers as a competitive 
advantage. Unlike brand investments, warranties do not require up-front investments and they 
enhance sellers’ abilities to charge price premiums. Furthermore, warranties may assist suppliers 
in their segmentation strategies. As our findings suggest, sellers’ ability to charge price 
premiums increases when buyers’ quality-sensitiveness increases. Therefore, sellers may target 
quality-sensitive market segments with warranty contracts and price premiums, whereas standard 
contracts might appeal to price-sensitive market segments. In contrast to corporate brand name 
investments, the quality-assuring properties of warranties do not depend on repeat business 
(Kirmani and Rao 2000). In many B2B markets, transactions are organized as projects where 
suppliers are selected based on a competitive bidding process although quality may suffer if low 
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price is emphasized (Holt, Olomolaiye, and Harris 1995). Therefore, suppliers of high-quality 
services in project markets might use warranties as a credible support for their quality promise 
and as a means to achieve price premiums even in short-term transactions.  
Finally, firms providing search services may want to invest in promoting their corporate 
brand name for a variety of reasons. However, our findings indicate that such investments will 
not affect their ability to charge price premiums. 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
First, our findings support the arguments of Rao and Monroe (1996) and compare well to 
findings of extant research (Biong 2013; Rao and Bergen 1992) on the relationship between 
brand investments and price premiums. Despite our attempts to explain positive and negative 
associations between concepts such as reputation, brand names, brand equity, brand credibility 
and price premiums in economics of information and brand management perspectives (e.g., Ba 
and Pavlou 2002; Bendixen, Bukasa, and Abratt 2004; Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002; Firth 
1993), many questions remain for further research. Therefore, studies further integrating the 
economics of information theory’s and brand management theory’s perspectives on brand equity 
investments and pricing effects with careful comparisons of B2B and B2C contexts should be 
promising issues for further studies. 
Second, both our and Rao and Bergen’s study (1992) rely on surveys and perceptual 
measures of the focal variables, yet from suppliers’ vs. buyers’ perspective respectively. 
Similarly, rather than measuring realized price premiums, many studies rely on hypothetical 
price premium measures (i.e., how much more are you/is your company willing to pay for…) 
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(Bendixen, Bukasa, and Abratt 2004; Hutton 1997; Persson 2010), a method that may overstate 
willingness to pay (Voelckner 2006). Furthermore, many studies do not distinguish clearly 
between price premiums (i.e. an above normal price providing above normal margins for a given 
quality) and premium prices (i.e., a higher but still a competitive price for a higher quality). To 
reduce potential bias with perceptual and hypothetical measures, interest has recently grown in 
analyzing marketing and financial performance through econometric models using longitudinal 
secondary data (see for example Journal of Marketing, November 2009). In this tradition, there 
have been published econometric studies showing the financial value of branding and of 
reputation (e.g., Ailawadi, Neslin, and Lehmann 2003; Joshi and Hanssens 2010; Madden, Fehle, 
and Fournier 2006; Roberts and Dowling 2002). Unfortunately, none of these studies examines 
to what extent volume or price affects financial performance. Incorporating data about prices and 
sales together with data about brand investments and other types of signals (Kirmani and Rao 
2000) in econometric analyses might be feasible to test how various types of quality-assuring 
mechanisms affect price premiums. Do these mechanisms add to or substitute for each other? To 
what extent will price or volume affect financial performance (Joshi and Hanssens 2010)? 
Especially, more precise measures of price premiums, including marginal costs of production, 
profits and trade margins (Klein and Leffler 1981) to distinguish between price premiums and 
premium prices, might fit well into such analyses. 
Finally, our sample has some limitations. For theory testing purposes, we decided to test our 
hypotheses in one specific context, subcontractors who supply plumbing and electrical 
installation services to the construction industry. Similar to Rao and Bergen’s procedure (1992) 
we divided our sample into two groups, services dominated by search attributes and services 
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dominated by experience attributes. Although the sellers’ perspective is relevant for examining 
the effect of sellers’ marketing mix variables, this division builds on the sellers’ judgments of 
buyers’ abilities to assess service quality. Therefore, we cannot disregard that biases might 
influence our results. Future research should therefore be conducted among B2B industries 
predominantly characterized as “search” and others predominantly characterized as 
“experience,” and should also examine to what extent suppliers are selected through competitive 
bidding processes from sellers’ and from buyers’ perspectives (e.g., Biong 2013). 
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Table 1 
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  S. D. η1  ξ1  ξ2  ξ3 ξ4  ξ5 
η1 Price premium 2.93 1.66 0.89          
ξ1 Brand investments 3.43 0.12 -0.11  0.93        
ξ2  Warranties  3.95 1.41 0.23 ** 0.02  0.79      
ξ3 Punishment 5.80 1.17 -0.05  -0.09  0.07  0.82    
ξ4 Quality sensitiveness 4.89 1.12 0.07  0.06  -0.02  0.26 **0.70   
ξ5 Reputation 6.08 1.41 -0.01  0.09  0.15 * 0.25 **0.26 ** 0.85 
p-value < .01 ** 
p-value < .05 * 
Cronbach Alpha in diagonal and in italics 
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Table 2 
Regression Analysis 
  Dependent variable: η1 Price premium 
Independent variables Search services 
H1b – H4b 
Experience service 
H1a – H4a 
  Regression 
coefficient 
t-
value 
 Regression 
coefficient 
t-
value 
 
ξ1 Brand investments 
(H1a – supported) 
(H1b – not supported) 
 
-0.09 -0.91  -0.16 -1.79 * 
ξ2 Warranties 
(H2a – not supported) 
(H2b – supported) 
 
0.10 1.02  0.36 4.10 ** 
ξ3  Punishment  
(H3a – supported) 
(H3b – not supported) 
 
-0.08 -0.75  -0.18 -1.88 * 
ξ4 Quality sensitiveness 
(H4a – supported) 
(H4b – not supported) 
0.03 0.25  0.21 2.40 ** 
Control variable        
ξ5 Reputation -0.10 -1.01  0.05 0.58  
 R-Square 0.03   0.19   
p-value < 0.01 ** 
p-value < 0.05 * 
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APPENDIX A 
Items Used to Measure the Constructs 
Anchor points: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree 
Items Statement Factor loading 
Quality 
sensitiveness 1 
Our organization feels that high service quality is 
crucial for our customers. 
λ 0.37 
Quality 
sensitiveness 2 
Our customers would suffer a significant 
monetary loss if the quality of our services were 
low. 
λ 0.80 
Quality 
sensitiveness 3 
Our customers check that the quality of the 
installation services they receive from us always 
are of a high level of quality. λ 0.70 
Punishment 1 Our company would suffer significant economic 
losses if our service quality were revealed to be 
low. λ 0.83 
Punishment 2 Our customers would blacklist and never do 
business with us again if we were to deliver low 
quality installation services. λ 0.83 
Brand 
investments 1 
Our company spends annually significant amounts 
of money on ads, commercials, promotions, etc. 
λ 0.91 
Brand 
investments 2 
Our company has invested considerable amounts 
of money on the community over the years. λ 0.84 
Brand 
investments 3 
Our company spends annually considerable 
amounts of money to be visible in the 
marketplace. λ 0.94 
Price premium 1 Our customers are willing to pay us a higher price 
than normal for similar services. 
λ 0.63 
Price premium 2 The typical price that we charge for our 
installation services is considerably higher than 
what our competitors charge for the same service. 
λ 0.88 
36 
 
Price premium 3 We are in the highest price level for our 
installation services compared to the industry in 
general. 
λ 0.88 
Price premium 4 Our organization claims a price whose magnitude 
is higher than normal for these kinds of 
installation services. 
λ 0.88 
Warranty 1 Compared to similar services in this industry, the 
length of the warranty on our company’s services 
is longer than that of standard contracts. 
λ 0.84 
Warranty 2 The number of warranties on our installation 
services exceeds what is usual or standard for 
these kinds of services. 
λ 0.81 
Warranty 3 Our company takes full responsibility for errors, 
deficiencies, or related damages even when the 
customers have no legal rights to claim repairs or 
refunds. λ 0.62 
Warranty 4 If our warranties are not fulfilled, they will lead to 
greater economic consequences for our company 
than those arising from legally protected  rights to 
claim repairs, refunds, etc. λ 0.48 
Performance 
ambiguity 1 
Customers have to assume that they are getting 
high-quality services from our company because 
there is no other way they can tell. 
λ 0.33 
Performance 
ambiguity 2 
It would be very time-consuming for a customer 
to check up on how well each of our employees is 
performing his job. 
λ 0.64 
Performance 
ambiguity 3 
It is very difficult for customers to evaluate the 
right amount of service that our company 
suggests. 
λ 0.76 
Performance 
ambiguity 4 
Our customers are not able to evaluate the quality 
of our services until the services are delivered. 
λ 0.72 
Performance 
ambiguity 5 
There are no sufficient standards for measuring 
the quality of installation services prior to 
purchase. 
λ 0.62 
Performance Our customers will have difficulties in defining 
the level of quality they need when buying 
λ 0.73 
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ambiguity 6 installation services. 
Performance 
ambiguity 7 
Customers are able to evaluate the quality of our 
company’s services only after an extended period 
of usage. 
λ 0.45 
Control variable   
Reputation 1 Our company has a superior reputation in the 
market place. 
λ 0.85 
Reputation 2 Our company has a reputation for delivering 
services with superior quality relative to other 
installation companies. 
λ 0.78 
Reputation 3 Our company is highly trustworthy. λ 0.80 
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Notes 
1 More specifically, adverse selection (pre-purchase) problems are resolved by using signals, 
whereas moral hazard (post-purchase) problems are resolved by using incentives (Mishra, Heide, 
and Cort 1998; Rao and Bergen 1992; Rao and Monroe 1996). However, adverse selection and 
moral hazard models apply the same principles for rewarding honesty and punishing dishonesty, 
and can therefore be analyzed simultaneously (Picard 1987; Rao and Monroe 1996). In the 
current context, we assume repeat business. Signals will therefore also serve incentive purposes 
(Klein and Leffler 1981). 
 
2 The categorization into experience vs. search depends on how easily quality attributes of goods 
and services can be assessed prior to purchase and use (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002; 
Nelson 1970). 
 
3 Throughout the article we use the terms “quality debasement” and “quality cheating” 
interchangeably. However, there might by a slight difference between these terms. Debasing 
quality might mean that the seller reduces quality below acceptable standard from one 
transaction to the next hoping that this quality reduction will not be detected by the buyer. 
Cheating might mean that the seller intends to supply substandard services in the first place 
without being detected. 
 
4 NACE (in French: Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté 
européenne) or the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Countries is 
a European industry standard classification system consisting of a 6-digit code. NACE is similar 
in function to the SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) and NAICS (North American Industry 
Classification System) systems.  
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